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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1977).
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
Roberts v. La., 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977).
Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977).
Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the capital punishment statutes in Geor-
gia,' Florida2 and Texas,3 all'of which permit-
ted a sentence of death for the crime of mur-
der.4 Those cases represented the first time
since Furman v. Georgia,5 that the Court decided
to afford the states the right to utilize capital
punishment in their criminal justice systems.
Since those statutes were designed to prevent
the arbitrary imposition of the death sentence
by providing certain procedural safeguards
s
the Court found that they satisfied the major
objection raised in Furman v. Georgia.' How-
ever, it did strike down the mandatory provi-
sions of North Carolina s and Louisiana9 in
cases of murder because they were "unduly
harsh and unworkably rigid."' 0 This year dif-
ferent provisions within the Georgia," Louis-
' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
3Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
'For an analysis of the 1976 Supreme Court deci-
sions, see Note, 67J. CRuIN. L. & C. 437 k19 7 6 ).
5 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6 The basic procedural requirements seem to be:
(1) That there be sentencing guides, usually
expressed in terms of aggravating circum-
stances, to aid the sentencing authority in
making the decision whether to impose the
death penalty; and
(2) That there be a separate procedure at which
the defendant has an opportunity to bring
any mitigating circumstances to the attention
of the sentencing authority.
See generally 67J. CRIM. L. & C. 437 (1976).
'Justice Stewart found that the sentence of death
was "wantonly and so freakishly imposed." 408 U.S.
at 310 (Stewart, J." concurring). Justice White found
that there was no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which the death penalty was imposed
from the many cases in which it was not. Id. at 313
(White, J., concurring).
s Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
9 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
10 428 U.S. at 293.
" See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977);
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
iana, 12 and Florida 3 statutes were before the
Court as it resolved various questions left in
the wake of the 1976 decisions.
Most notably, the Court this term decided
that it was unconstitutional for Georgia to im-
pose a death sentence for the crime of rape.
4 :
The Court also found unconstitutional a Lou-
siana statute which mandated a sentence of
death for the murder of a police officer."s In
related cases, the Court clarified some other
issues, including the application of the due
process clause to capital sentencing proce-
dures, 16 and the ramifications of excluding
potential jurors who have reservations about
the use of capital punishment.' 7 Finally, in the
only case which seems to broaden the applica-
tion of the death penalty,' the Court consid-
ered the relevance of the ex postfacto clause to
pre-Furman murders.
As these cases illustrate, the Supreme Court
continued its bitter debate over the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty this term, 9 but
there is no doubt that capital punishment is
here to stay. In reaffirming its decisions of
1976,20 the Court reiterated its view that the
imposition of the death penalty for the crime
of murder is not a per se violation of the
eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. As such, the Court this year nec-
essarily narrowed its scope of inquiry, and only
considered the particular statutes before it in
12 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977).
13 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977);
Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977).
'4 Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).i5 Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977).
16 Gardner v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977).
17 Davis v. Georgia, 430 U.S. 349 (1976).
18 Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977).
', See, e.g., Justice Marshall's vigorous dissent in
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
50 See notes 1-3 and 8-9 supra and accompanying
text.
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an attempt to determine whether they had the
effect of imposing death on a prisoner in the
arbitrary, capricious or freakish fashion which
Furman v. Georgia sought to prohibit.?' Viewed
in this light, these cases can be considered as
clean-up work for the Court left over from its
major decisions of 1976.22 That is not to say,
however, that this Term's decisions are unim-
portant, for the Court did resolve some very
significant issues. Viewed as a whole, the tenor
of this Court's decisions was cautious, signifying
a reluctance to liberalize to any appreciable
extent the use of the death penalty. As such,
they represent an attempt by the Court to limit
its use, thus entrenching some of the spirit of
its decision in Furman and its ultimate respect
for human life.
In Coker v. Georgia,23 the Court for the first
time since Furman confronted a situation in
which the death penalty was applied in a non-
murder case. Petitioner Coker was convicted
and sentenced to death for the rape of Mrs.
Carver.24 Pursuant to the Georgia statutory
provisions which provide for a separate sent-
encing procedure, 2 the jury was instructed to
determine whether a sentence of death should
be imposed. 26 It found that two of the three
-'21 See note 7 supra.
22 See note 20supra.
2 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
1 The Court outlines the facts as follows:
While serving various sentences for murder,
rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, peti-
tioner escaped from the Ware Correctional In-
stitution near Waycross, Ga., on September 2,
1974. At approximately 11 p. m. that night,
petitioner entered the house of Allen and Elnita
Carver through an unlocked kitchen door.
Threatening the couple with a "board," he tied
up Mr. Carver in the bathroom, obtained a
knife from the kitchen, and took Mr. Carver's
money and the keys to the family car. Brandish-
ing the knife and saying "you know what's going
to happen to you if you try anything, don't
you," Coker then raped Mrs. Carver. Soon
thereafter, petitioner drove away in the Carver
car, taking Mrs. Carver with him. Mr. Carver,
freeing himself, notified the police; and not
long thereafter petitioner was apprehended.
Mrs. Carver was otherwise unharmed.
97 S. Ct. at 2863.
2' Basically, Georgia provides for a bifurcated trial.
The first stage is devoted to.a jury determination of
guilt or innocence. The second stage is for a jury
determination of an appropriate sentence in the
event that the defendant is found guilty. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1976).
26 For a jury in Georgia to sentence a defendant to
statutory aggravating circumstances 27 for the
crime of rape were present and sentenced
Coker to death by electrocution. The Court
did not instruct the jury regarding the third
aggravating circumstance. In reviewing the
death, it must find that certain enumerated aggravat-
ing circumstances are present and that they are not
outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1976), provides:
Capital offenses; jury verdict and sentence.
Where, upon a trial by jury, a person is con-
victed of an offense which may be punishable
by death, a sentence of death shall not be
imposed unless the jury verdict includes a find-
ing of at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance and a recommendation that such sen-
tence be imposed. Where a statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance is found and a recommenda-
tion of death is made, the court shall sentence
the defendant to death. Where a sentence of
death is not recommended by the jury, the
court shall sentence the defendant to imprison-
ment as provided by law. Unless the jury trying
the case makes a finding of at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance and recommends the
death sentence in its verdict, the court shall not
sentence the defendant to death, provided that
no such finding of statutory aggravating circum-
stances shall be necessary in offenses of treason
or aircraft hijacking. The provisions of this
section shall not affect a sentence when the case
is tried without a jury or when the judge accepts
a plea of guilty.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2302 (1976 Supp.) provides:
Recommendation to mercy. -In all capital cases,
other than those of homicide, when the verdict
is guilty, with a recommendation to mercy, it
shall be legal and shall be a recommendation to
the judge of imprisonment for life. Such rec-
ommendation shall be binding upon the judge.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1976 Supp.) provides:
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances; death
penalty. -(a) The death penalty may be imposed
for the offenses of aircraft hijacking or treason,
in any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which
the death penalty may be authorized, the judge
shall consider, or he shall include in his instruc-
tions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating
circumstances or aggravating circumstances
otherwise authorized by law and any of the
following statutory aggravating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob-
bery, or kidnapping was committed by a person
with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony, or the offense of murder was committed
by a person who has a substantial history of
serious assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob-
bery, or kidnapping was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of
[Vol. 68
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case, Justice White, speaking for the Court,"
determined that death was "grossly dispropor-
tionate and excessive punishment for the crime
another capital felony, or aggravated battery,
or the offense of murder was committed while
the offender was engaged in the commission o f
burglary or arion in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed
robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person in
a public place by means of a weapon or device
which would normally be hazardous to the lives
of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of
murder for himself or another, for the purpose
of receiving money or any other thing of mone-
tary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former
judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or
former district attorney or solicitor during or
because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another
to commit murder or committed murder as an
agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob-
bery or kidnapping was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed
against any peace officer, corrections employee
or fireman while engaged in the performance
of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by
a person in, or who has escaped from the lawful
custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the pur-
pose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing
a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinement, of himself or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined
by the trial judge to be warranted by the evi-
dence shall be given in charge and in writing to
the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if the
verdict be a recommendation of death, shall
designate in writing, signed by the foreman of
the jury, the aggravating circumstance or cir-
cumstances which it found beyond a reasonable
doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make
such designation. Except in cases of treason or
aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances enumer-
ated in section 27-2534.1(b) is so found the
death penalty shall not be imposed.
27 The Georgia code outlines three separate aggra-
vating circumstances for the crime of rape, but the
judge in Coker felt that only two of them were
present: whether the rape had been committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony and whether the rape had been committed in
the course of committing another capital felony.
of rape '29 and thus constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment.
Justice White first considered the reasons
for the eighth amendment and concluded that
"a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitu-
tional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is
nothing more than the purposeless and need-
less imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime." 30 He felt that the role of the Court is to
make informed judgments, relying on such
factors as history and precedent, legislative
attitudes and jury responses as reflected over
the years in their sentencing decisions."i In
surveying current legislative attitudes, the
Court found that Georgia was the only state at
the present time with a constitutional statute
which authorizes a sentence of death when the
rape victim is an adult woman. 32 Further, the
plurality found it significant that at no time in
the past fifty years has a majority of states
authorized death as proper punishment for
rape. As for the jury response to death for
the crime of rape, the Court found that in
sixty-three rape cases reviewed by the Georgia
Supreme Court since Furman, only five were
sentenced to death.34 Based on these statistics,
Justice White could not agree with the State's
contention that contemporary attitudes as ex-
pressed by legislators and jurors found the
death penalty acceptable as a punishment for
Thus the third circumstance, a rape so "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim," was not considered by thejury. 97 S. Ct. at 2863-65. See note 26supra.
I Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Stevens,
formed the plurality opinion. It is significant to note
that Justice Blackmun concurred in the plurality
opinion. Previously, he had concurred in the deci-
sions of the Court to uphold the Georgia statute in
Gregg v. Georgia, the Florida statute in Proffitt v.
Florida and the Texas statute in Jurek v. Texas. Fur-
thermore, he also filed opinions in Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 307 and Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. at 363, dissenting from the Court's decision
to invalidate those death penalty statutes. That he
now joins the plurality in striking down the death
penalty for the crime of rape can be viewed as a
moderation of his earlier positions.
29 97 S. Ct. at 2866.
30 Id. at 2865.
31 Id. at 2866.
32 Id. at 2867.




rape. The Court ultimately felt that even in
light of all the statistics, the "Constitution con-
templates that in the end our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment."3 Feeling that death was
grossly disproportionate to the crime of rape,
the plurality struck down those particular pro-
visions of the Georgia statute as the state ap-
plied them to the crime of rape.36
In a controversial portion of White's plurality
opinion ,3 he took the opportunity to consider
the third aggravating circumstance contem-
plated by the statute, although it was not pres-
ent in the case: a rape which is "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind, or ag-
gravated battery to the victim. '38 In so doing,
he clearly extended the decision beyond the
facts of the case so as to strike down the death
penalty in all instances of rape. White reasoned
that since Georgia does not punish by death
any deliberate murder which is not accompanied
by aggravating circumstances, 39 it would not be
easy to justify a punishment of death for the
crime of rape that does not involve the death
of the victim: "[It would be] difficult to accept
the notion that the rape ... should be pun-
ished more heavily than the deliberate
killer .... 40
Justice Powell in a separate opinion agreed
with the conclusion reached by the plurality in
this instance, but dissented from what he deter-
mined was a plurality opinion "so sweeping as
to foreclose each of the fifty state legislatures
from creating a narrowly defined substantive
crime of aggravated rape punishable by
death." 41 He felt the plurality had not carried
their burden of showing that society finds the
penalty disproportionate for all rapists in all
circumstances. Since the third aggravating cir-
cumstance in the Georgia statute was not before




36 As outlined in note 27 supra, two of a possible
three statutory aggravating circumstances were be-
fore the Court.
37 97 S. Ct. at 2869.
s GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (Supp. 1976).
See note 26supra.
39 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1976). See note
26 supra.
40 97 S. Ct. at 2870.41 Id. at 2870.
Chief Justice Burger,joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, dissented, taking issue with every conclu-
sion reached by the plurality. He began by
pointing out that since Coker was already sen-
tenced to life imprisonment for armed robbery
and rape prior to his escape, the result of the
decision is that the states are now effectively
prevented from imposing any further punish-
ment upon him for his latest activities. Essen-
tially, he was claiming that the states had no
further deterrent at their disposal: "To what
extent we have left States 'elbow room' to
protect innocent persons from depraved hu-
man beings like Coker remains in doubt.
42
Chief Justice Burger's first contention with
the plurality opinion over was the breadth of
its holding. He would have narrowed the in-
quiry to the facts before the court: prisoner
serving life sentence; prior criminal record,
including rape; and a proven propensity to
repeat his offenses, particularly rape. After
surveying the doctrine of recidivism and var-
ious punishment-enhancement statutes ,
4
Burger asserted that it was entirely appropriate
for a state to take "an individual's 'well demon-
strated propensity for life-endangering behav-
ior' into account in devising punitive mea-
sures." 44 He would therefore hold that death
as imposed in this case was within the power
reserved to the state and "leave for another
day the question of whether such sanction
would be proper under other circumstances." 45
However, this point does not come to grips
with the limitations placed upon the states as
expressed in the plurality opinion. The eighth
amendment absolutely prohibits states from im-
posing the death penalty for rape since it is
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime, thus
negating any legitimate justifications, including
recidivism, that a state may propose for such a
penalty.
Chief Justice Burger's next contention was
with the plurality's conclusion that public opin-
ion, as voiced by state legislatures, does not
favor the death penalty for rape. First, he
421 Id. at 2872.
43 Id. at 2874, (citing Congressional decisions to (a)
punish a third felony more severely than the first
two felonies, 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (e)(1) (1970), and (b)
punish a second conviction for assault on a mail
carrier more severely than the first conviction, 18
U.S.C. § 2114. (1970)).
44 97 S. Ct. at 2874.
11 Id. at 2875.
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claimed that possibly there has been a trend
since Furman, citing the Georgia, Louisiana,
and North Carolina statutes, 46 and explained
the other states' failures to enact similar provi-
sions since Furman as perhaps reflecting "hasty
legislative compromise occasioned by time pres-
sures following Furman, [and] a desire to wait
on the experience of those States which did
enact such statutes.1 47 Second, he criticized the
majority for misplaced reliance on the silence
of many legislators:
Having in mind the swift changes in position of
some Members of this Court in the short span of
five years, can it rationally be considered a rele-
vant indicator of what our society deems 'cruel
and unusual' to look solely to what legislatures
have refrained from doing under conditions of
great uncertainty arising from our less than lucid
holdings on the Eighth Amendment?"
He effectively argued that each state is a labo-
ratory; that perhaps death for rape is a deter-
rent; that such a statute may well encourage
more victims to report the crime of rape; and
finally that it could make citizens feel more
secure. In any case, Chief Justice Burger ar-
gued that the Court should not foreclose the
possibility of experimentation which federalism
is intended to encourage, for legislative judg-
ment may be altered based on the experience
in Georgia. Finally, Burger refused to allow a
majority of legislatures to decide the issue. He
pointed out that more than one-third of Amer-
ican jurisdictions prior to Furman had consist-
ently provided the death penalty for rape, thus
voiding any contention that death was rejected
by state legislatures in recent times.
49
More disturbing to Chief Justice Burger was
the plurality's subjective conclusion that death
for rape is cruel and unusual under all circum-
stances: "In striking down the death penalty
imposed upon [Coker], the Courthas over-
stepped the bounds of proper constitutional
adjudication by substituting its policy judgment
for that of the state legislature." 50 He felt that
decisions of state legislatures with regard to
criminal sanctions should be presumed valid
by the Court.5' Yet, while criticizing the plural-
46 Id. at 2876.
47 Id. at 2877.
48 Id. (emphasis in original).
49 Id. at 2877.
50 Id. at 2872.
51 Only last Term in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
ity for "[engrafting] their conceptions of proper
public policy"5 2 onto legislative judgments,
Chief Justice Burger at the same time recog-
nized that the eighth amendment's "concept of
disproportionality bars the death penalty for
minor crimes." He views rape as anything but
a minor crime (as though the plurality does
not), yet provides no guidelinesnor suggestions
as to how anyone, much less the Court, can
determine in exactly which instances, and for
exactly what crimes the Court should impose
their concept of disproportionality upon the
states.
The decision in Coker v. Georgia, as Burger
pointed out in his dissent,5 leaves the status of
many capital punishment provisions in doubt.
Given the breadth of Justice White's plurality
holding in light of the fact that rape can be
such a brutal and demoralizing crime, the fact
that Justice Blackmun uncharacteristically
joined in the plurality opinion 5 and the unwav-
ering positions of Justices Mayshall and Bren-
nan56 who oppose the death pehalty at all times,
the reasoning and conclusion of the plurality
opinion can be expected to have some enduring
effect upon death penalty statutes in future
years. The plurality drew a strong distinction
between crimes that involve the life of the
victim and those that do not; therefore, the
constitutionality of death penalty provisions for
treason, hijacking, and kidnapping, as well as
mass terrorism, are suspect. While justice Pow-
ell concurred in a separate opinion, he pre-
fered to be more moderate in his approach,
leaving doubt as to where he will stand in
future non-murder cases. That leaves the
153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), Mr.
Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr.
Justice Stevens warned that "the requirement of
the Eighth Amendment must be applied with
an awareness of the limited role to be played by
the courts," and noted that "we may not act as
judges as we might as legislators," Id., at 174-
175, 96 S. Ct. at 295.
97 S. Ct. at 2876 n.8.
52 Id. at 2872.
5 Id.
54Id. at 2880.
See note 28 supra.
56 Throughout this Term, Justice Marshall and
Justice Brennan both reiterated their solid and un-
wavering position that the death penalty is a cruel
and unusual punishment in all circumstances. See
Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. at 2870; Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. at 364-65; Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S.




Court split seven to two 5 7 on the rape issue,
with a six to three"s split more likely in other
non-murder cases that present more gruesome
facts for the Court to consider.
In Roberts v. Louisiana,s9 the Court, in a per
curiam decision, again struck down Louisiana's
mandatory death sentence provision which in-
cludes a section relating to the killing of a
police officer.60 In that case, Roberts was con-
victed of murdering a police officer and was
sentenced to death as required by Louisiana
law. 6 The Court found that Roberg v. Louis-
iana6" (decided last term) and Washington v.
5' Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell and Stevens, JJ., voting against the use of the
death penalty, with Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
voting in favor of its use.
58 Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ., v6ting against the use of the death
penalty, with Burger, CJ., Powell and Rehnquist,
JJ., voting in favor of its use.
59 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977).
60 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1974) provides in
part:
First degree murder
First degree murder is the killing of a human
being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent
to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is
engaged in the perpetration or attempted per-
petration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
rape or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent
to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon, a
fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in
the performance of his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent
to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and has
previously been convicted of an unrelated mur-
der or is serving a life sentence; or(4) When the offender has a specific intent
to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more
than one person; [or]
(5) When the offender has specific intent to
commit murder and has been offered or has
received anything of value for committing the
murder.
For the purposes of Paragraph (2) herein the
term peace officer shall be defined and include
any constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or
state policeman, game warden, federal law en-
forcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole
officer, probation officer, judge, district attor-
ney, assistant district attorney, or district attor-
neys' investigator.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree
murder shall be punished by death.
In 1975, § 14:30(1) was amended to add the crime
of aggravated burglary as a predicate felony for first-
degree murder. LA. ACTS 1975, No. 327.
61 See note 60supra.
62 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
Loui 'ana'" were dispositive, emphasizing, as
was done in the earlier Roberts opinion, the
need for the sentencing authority to consider
mitigating circumstances. "[I]t is incorrect to
suppose that no mitigating circumstances can
exist when the victim is a police officer."6 The
case was remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion. Curiously,
the Court again specifically left open the ques-
tion of the propriety of the death sentence
when mandatorily imposed upon one who com-
mits murder while serving a life sentence."
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the grounds
that such a provision was not cruel and unusual
punishment, even under Furman, since there
was no evidence that it would be freakishly or
arbitrarily imposed."6 Dismissing the 1976 Rob-
erts decision as only relevant to another provi-
sion in the Louisiana code, 67 and Washington as
too hastily decided, Justice Rehnquist went on
to argue that if the legislature can allow the
jury to weigh aggravating against mitigating
circumstances, then the legislature can certainly
decide at which point "aggravating" can be so
overwhelming as to render "mitigating" irrele-
vant. Although this proposition has some ab-
stract argumentative merit, it does not address
the question which the majority decided: Is a
mandatory provision inherently cruel and un-
usual?
This case is significant in that many observers
expected the Court, in light of last term's
acceptance of the per se constitutionality of the
death penalty, to at least uphold mandatory
provisions dealing with very specifically defined
crimes. In particular, the Court had previously
left unresolved the constitutionality of a man-
datory death sentence imposed upon a pris-
oner, sentenced to life imprisonment, who then
commits murder.s Thus, although the Court
had struck down the broader Louisiana provi-
sion handled in the 1976 Roberts decision, it was
. 428 U.S. 906 (1976). Washington dealt specifically
with the murder of a police officer, for which Wash-
ington was sentenced to death. The Court struck
down the sentence, which was based on the same
section in the Louisiana code as the one which was in
question this term in Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 S. Ct.
1993 (1977). See LA. REV. STAT. Axx. § 14:30(2)
(1974), note 60 supra.
64 97 S. Ct. at 1995-96.
• See 97 S. Ct. at 1995 n.2, & 1996 n.5.66 d. at 1998.
67 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(1) (1974) note
60supra.
' 97 S. Ct. at 1996 n.5.
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possible that the Court would find the provision
in question in this case acceptable. However,
since the Court found the death penalty unac-
ceptable even with respect to a category as
narrowly defined as peace-officers, the efficacy
of any mandatory provisions is left in doubt.
In Gardner v. Florida ,69 the plurality found
that Gardner, convicted for murder and sen-
tenced to death, was denied due process of law
during the sentencing stage of his bifurcated
trial. At the conclusion of his trial, the judge
instructed the jury pursuant to Florida law70 to
69 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
70 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1972):
Sentence of death or life imprisonment for
capital felonies; further proceedings to deter-
mine sentence
(1) Separate proceedings on issue of pen-
alty.-Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt
of a defendant of a capital felony, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding
to determine whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment as au-
thorized by § 775.082. The proceeding shall be
conducted by the trial judge before the trial
jury as soon as practicable. Any such evidence
which the court deems to have probative value
may be received, regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence, pro-
vided the defendant is accorded a fair opportu-
nity to rebut any hearsay statements. However,
this subsection shall not be construed to author-
ize the introduction of any evidence secured in
violation of the constitutions of the United States
or of the State of Florida. The state and the
defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to
present argument for or against sentence of
death.
(2) Advisory sentence by the jury.-After
hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate
and render an advisory sentence to the court
based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circum-
stances exist as enumerated in subsection (6);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circum-
stances exist as enumerated in subsection (7),
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances
found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether
the defendant should be sentenced to life [im-
prisonment] or death.
(3) Findings in support of sentence of
death. -Notwithstanding the recommendation
of a majority of the jury, the court after weigh-
ing the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances shall enter a sentence of life imprison-
ment or death, but if the court imposes a sen-
tence of death, it shall set forth in writing its
findings upon which the sentence of death is
based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances
exist as enumerated in subsection (5), and (b)
That there are insufficient mitigating circum-
decide whether to impose death or life im-
prisonment. While they were deliberating, the
judge requested a presentence investigation of
petitioner Gardner by the Florida Parole and
Probation Commission. Meanwhile, the jury
found that the aggravating circumstances 71 of
the murder were outweighed by the mitigating
circumstances 2 of Gardner's drunken state and
suggested life imprisonment. The judge re-
versed the jury's sentence, imposed the death
stances, as enumerated in subsection (6), to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances. In
each case in which the court imposes the death
sentence, the determination of the court shall
be supported by specific written findings of fact
based upon the circumstances in subsections (6)
and (7) and upon the records of the trial and
the sentencing proceedings. If the court does
not make the findings requiring'the death sen-
tence, the court shall impose sentence of life
imprisonment in accordance with section 775.
082.
71 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (1972):
(5) Aggravating circumstances. -Aggravat-
ing circumstances shall be limited to the follow-
ing:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a
person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted
of another capital felony or of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while
the defendant was engaged, or was an accom-
plice, in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or flight after commiting or attempting
to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary,.
kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destruc-
tive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or affecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pe-
cuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to dis-
rupt, or hinder the lawful exercise of any gov-
ernmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.
72 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6) (1972):
(6) Mitigating circumstances.- Mitigating cir-
cumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history
of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while
the defendant was under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance:
(c) The victim was a participant in the de-
fendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the
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penalty, and in his ultimate findings, stated
that his conclusion was "based on the evidence
presented at both stages of the bifurcated pro-
ceeding, the arguments of counsel, and his
review of 'the factual information contained in
said presentence investigation.' ' ' ' The trial
judge did not comment on the contents of the
confidential portion of the presentence report
at trial and did not disclose them to defense
counsel. However, defense counsel made no
request to either examine the full report or to
be apprised of its contents. On appeal to the
Florida Supreme Court, Gardner argued that
the trial court had erred in not disclosing the
information which was in the presentence in-
vestigation. The Florida Supreme Court did
not deal with this contention, stating only that
the record had been carefully reviewed and
that the sentence should be affirmed. 74 How-
ever, the confidential portion of the present-
ence report was not included in the record on
appeal, and thus the Florida Supreme Court
did not have the opportunity to see the infor-
mation which had influenced the trial court in
its sentencing decision.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Stewart
and Powell, first dismissed the state's assertion
that the Court's decision in Williams v. New
York 75 was controlling, concluding that the facts
were materially different in the present case.
Most important was the fact that in Williams
the "defendant's background . . . contained in
the presentence report [was] described in detail
by the trial judge in open court. '76 Stevens
further noted that the evolving standards of
society demand that death be looked at in a
capital felony committed by another person and
his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme du-
ress or under the substantial domination of
another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreci-
ate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of
the crime.
73 430 U.S. at 353.
74 See id.
11 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1948). The
facts in Williams were similar in that "the trial judge
rejected the jury's recommendation of mercy and
imposed the death sentence in reliance, at least in
part, on material contained in a report prepared by
the court's probation department." 430 U.S. at 355.
76 430 U.S. at 356.
different light than other sentences,77 due in
part to the Furman decision, and that it is vital
that the death sentence by imposed by virtue
of reason rather than "caprice or emotion."17
Justice Stevens then argued that the sentenc-
ing process must satisfy the requirements of
due process. However, in support of the prop-
osition, he relied on the principle expressed in
two previous cases that "the sentencing is a
critical stage of the criminal proceeding at
which [the defendant] is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel. ' 79 In one of the cases
which Stevens cites, Mempa v. Rhay, 0 the Court
specifically narrowed its holding to the situation
at hand,81 that is, the lack of a lawyer at a
deferred sentencing or revocation of probation
proceeding. In the other case, Specht v. Patter-
son,8 2 the Court confronted the issue of the
right of counsel to challenge results of psychi-
atric testing, holding that there was such a
right. As Justice Rehnquist points out in his
dissent, sentencing procedures in death penalty
cases have never before been held to be unfair
under the due process clause. Stevens thus can
be criticized for relying on two cases which are
only remotely similar to the case at bar to
support his proposition that "it is now clear
that the sentencing process ... must satisfy
the requirements of the Due Process Clause.1
8 3
After dismissing several reasons offered by the
state for maintaining the secrecy of such re-
77 "Since ... [Washington] was written almost thirty
years ago, this Court has acknowledged its obligation
to re-examine capital sentencing procedures against
evolving standards of procedural fairness in a civi-
lized society." Id. at 357.7 1 Id. at 358.
79 Id.
80 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
81 Id. at 137.
82 386 U.S. 605 (1966).
8 430 U.S. at 358.
8 The state contended that:
(a) An assurance of confidentiality to potential
sources of information is essential to enable
investigators to obtain relevant but sensitive
disclosures from persons unwilling to com-
ment publicly,
(b) Full disclosure of the presentence report
will unnecessarily delay the proceedings,
(c) Full disclosure of the presentence report,
which includes psychiatric and psychological
evaluations, will disrupt the process of reha-
bilitation, and
(d) Trial judges can be trusted to exercise their




ports as superfluous and improper in light of
the Court's 1976 decisions,, Stevens asserted
that the state supreme court had a duty to
consider the full record on appeal. Only then
can it protect against the arbitrary and discrim-
inatory effects of death penalty statutes as em-
phasized by members of the Court in Fur-
man.
85
Finally, Stevens dismissed the contention that
Gardner had waived his right to object to the
use of the pretrial report by not promptly
requesting that its contents be disclosed at the
trial level. He offered several reasons for this
finding of no effective waiver by Gardner in-
cluding: (1) the state was not urging that the
objection had been ,waived; (2) the Florida
Supreme Court has a duty to consider the total
record on appeal; and (3) there is no basis for
presuming that defendant made a knowing
waiver. 8
6
Justice White and Justice Blackmun con-
curred in separate opinions s7 Both relied in
part on the Court's decision in Woodson v. North
Carolina,8 a case which utilized the eighth
amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment rather than the due process clause to
strike down the North Carolina mandatory
capital punishment statute. Justice Rehnquist
dissented 9 from White and Blackmun's indi-
rect use of the eighth amendment, asserting
that procedures alone can not convert a sen-
tence into a cruel and unusual punishment.
The plurality's application in Gardner of the
due process clause to the sentencing proce-
dures of death penalty proceedings was a sig-
nificant deviation from its prior death penalty
cases. Since Furman, the Court has without
exception utilized the eighth amendment's pro-
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment to
test the validity of various capital punishment
statutes. 90 In holding that the due process
clause applies to the sentencing stage of the
bifurcated trials now favored by numerous
states in death penalty cases, the plurality has
8 See note 7 supra.
430 U.S. at 360-61.
87 Id. at 362-64.
S428 U.S. 280 (1976).
s9 430 U.S. at 371.
90 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas , 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
tapped a new resource to protect itself against
the persistent attacks of many critics, headed
by Justice Rehnquist, of the Court's broad use
of the eighth amendment to limit the scope of
the death penalty. As such, the plurality has
diversified the underlying reasons for restrict-
ing the states in their use of capital punishment.
And, since the principles of due process of law
are relatively settled, the states will necessarily
be more cautious in their decisions to imple-
ment the death penalty. This case represents,
then, one more instance of the Court refusing
to broaden the use of the death penalty, thus
ensuring that the states will utilize it properly,
with caution and in a non-discriminatory fash-
ion.
In Dobbert v. Florida,9 the Court considered
a pre-Furman murder. Dobbert was convicted
of, among other things, murdering his son
and one of his daughters. After the murders,
but before trial commenced, Furman v. Georgia
was handed down, thereby causing the Florida
capital punishment statute, which was on the
books at the time of the murders, to be invali-
dated.92 Florida soon passed another statute,93
tried Dobbert again and then sentenced him to
death under that new statute. His application
to the Florida Supreme Court, in which he
complained that such an action by Florida vio-
lated the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution,9 was denied. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, Dobbert again contended,
among other things,9 5 that his sentence of death
violated the ex post facto clause and thus he
should be sentenced to life imprisonment. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing the opinion for .the
Court, upheld Dobbert's conviction.
The Court considered three ex post facto ar-
guments made by Dobbert. First, he contended
that there was a change in the function of both
judge and jury between the time of his acts
and the time of the trial. Prior to Furman,
Florida juries had the sole right to determine
whether to impose the death penalty. 6 The
91 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977).
'2 See. Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla.
1972), in which the Florida Supreme Court invali-
dated FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(a) (1971).
93 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1972), upheld in Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). For edited portions of
this statute, see notes 68-70supra.
9 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
" Dobbert had an equal protection claim, as well
as a pretrial publicity claim.
9 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971):
1977]
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more recent statute provides for a jury recom-
mendation of death or life imprisonment,
which is then reviewed by the trial judge.97
Justice Rehnquist defined the inquiry in terms
of the two statutes in toto, rather than engaging
in a particularized factual inquiry. Comparing
the two statutes in the abstract, he concluded
that "the new statute simply altered the meth-
ods employed in determining whether the
death penalty was to be imposed; there was no
change in the quantum of punishment attached
to the crime."9 He suggested that the new
statute did not make criminal "a theretofore
innocent act, not aggravated a crime previously
committed, nor provided greater punishment,
nor changed the proof necessary to convict." 99
In fact, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, the
newer statute provides more protection gener-
ally for the accused than did the old. Florida
had amended its capital punishment statutes,
as a result of Furman, to provide for a bifur-
cated proceeding as well as an automatic review
by the state supreme court. 19
Second, Dobbert claimed that in light of the
subsequent holding in Furman, there was no
death penalty "in effect" in Florida at the time
of his murderous acts. At this point, Rehnquist
relied on a fair warning test, arguing that since
the prior statute, though later held unconstitu-
tional, provided fair warning to all as to the
degree of culpability which that state ascribed
to murder, Dobbert was on notice and thus did
not have an ex postfacto claim.0l1 Justice Stevens
in his dissent took strong exception to this test,
as will be discussed later.
Dobbert's third ex post facto claim was that
the new statute provided for a stiffer penalty
because it now mandated that twenty-five years
be served on a life sentence before one is
Recommendation to mercy.-A defendant
found guilty by a jury of an offense punishable
by death shall be sentenced to death unless the
verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by
a majority of the jury. When the verdict includes
a recommendation to mercy by a majority of
the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant
to life imprisonment. A defendant found guilty
by the court of an offense punishable by death
on a plea of guilty or when a jury is waived shall
be sentenced by the court to death or life im-
prisonment.
" See notes 70-72 supra.
98 97 S. Ct. at 2298.
9 9 Id.
11 See note 70 supra.101 97 S. Ct. at 2300.
eligible for parole. The prior statute had con-
tained no such provision. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, again ignored the partic-
ular facts of the case and chose to focus on the
face of the statutes before him and reasoned
that since Dobbert had been sentenced to death
rather than life imprisonment, such changes in
the parole sections had "no effect on him. 1 °2
The dissent, choosing to look at the actual
effect of the entire statute as it worked on
Dobbert, took issue with this argument by the
majority, arguing that Dobbert would not have
been sentenced to death if the new statute had
not been utilized. Justice Rehnquist's sole re-
sponse was that there is no way of knowing
what the verdict would have been had the trial
been conducted under the old statute. 103
Dobbert also made an interesting equal pro-
tection argument to the Court. 1°4 He contended
that since Furman ultimately resulted in the
resentencing of hundreds of persons who had
been tried and sentenced to die up to that
point,10 5 he was effectively denied the equal
protection afforded to that group of six
hundred when he is classed with all those who
committed murder after the new statutes were
enacted. Rehnquist decided that "Florida ob-
viously had to draw the line at some point" and
concluded that it was "not irrational" for the
state to relegate Dobbert to the latter class.19 6
The use of the double negative "not irrational"
avoids the equal protection issue, however. The
standard question which the Court has consist-
ently used in the past when confronted with an
equal protection argument is: what rational rea-
son can there be for classing Dobbert in the
former group? And in drawing lines between
categories, the states usually have been re-
quired to present some principled reasons for
delineating the categories which result. Thus,
to say that a line had to be drawn somewhere
does not justify the drawing of an arbitrary
line anywhere.
Justice Stevens in his dissent adeptly boiled
the ex post facto claim down to its bare essentials:
At the time of [Dobbert's] offense, there was no
constitutional procedure for imposing the death
102 Id.
" The jury under the new system operates in an
advisory capacity as to the sentence whereas under
the old system the jury's recommendation was final.
See notes 70 & 94 supra.
104 97 S. Ct. at 2302.
101 Id. at 2306 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10' Id. at 2302.
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penalty in Florida.... It is undisputed, there-
fore, that a law passed after the offense is the
source of Florida's power to put [Dobbert] to
death.
... In the case before us the new standard
created the possibility of a death sentence that
could not have been lawfully imposed "when the
offense was cominitted. 17
The difference between Justice Stevens' ap-
proach and Justice Rehnquist's approach can
easily be detected. Whereas Rehnquist prefered
to look strictly to the face of the statute in
question, Stevens prefered to look at how the
statute worked on the defendant in the partic-
ular instance.
Justice Stevens vigorously attacked the fair
warning test devised by the majority in re-
sponse to Dobbert's second ex post facto claim
that there was no death penalty statute :'in
effect" in Florida. He argued that one purpose
of the ex post facto clause is to protect against
such a capricious application of after the face
legislation.10 8 He pointed out that citizens often
do not know the law, much less a court's
interpretation of it, and that Furman made it
clear the extent to which the death penalty was
arbitrarily imposed. 109 If fair warning were the
proper test, he continued, nothing would pre-
vent the other hundreds of people, whose
death sentences wvere lifted, from being exe-
cuted since they had the very same fair warning
as did Dobbert. 110 Justice- Stevens concluded
his dissent by observing the "manifestly intol-
erable results" which may very well result from
the Court's decision, and predicted that the
opinion will become "nothing more than an
archaic gargoyle." '
The importance of the Dobbert decision and
its ramifications for future interpretations of
the ex post facto clause are clouded for several
reasons. Rehnquist argued effectively, for in-
stance, that the resultant changes in the Florida
statutes were largely ameliorative and proce-
dural, thereby answering Dobbert's first ex post
facto argument which was based on the role
changes of judge and jury. His authority for
the position that such changes are not governed
by the clause is strong. However, it cannot be
107 Id. at 2303-05.
108 Id. at 2305.
109 Id. at 2306.
"1ld.
"I Id. at 2307.
denied that the Furman decision was unique in
its effects on various states' approaches to capi-
tal punishment. Therefore, when Dobbert fur-
ther contended that there was no statute "in
effect" in Florida, he recognized what the
Court had recognized in Furman, that is, that
the states had to completely alter their ap-
proach to capital punishment. Rehnquist fash-
ioned his fair warning test in response to this
argument from language in Chicot County Drain-
age District v. Baxter State Bank:"2 "The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determi-
nation, is an operative fact and may have con-
sequences which cannot justly be ignored."" 3
To argue that one of the consequences of the
prior statute was to provide fair warning to
Dobbert is to ignore the fact that Dobbert was
acting under an old system which members of
the Court in Furman found imposed death
"freakishly" and arbitrarily." 4 One could easily
agree with Justice Stevens' conclusion, then,
that "[a]s applied to pre-Furman death penalty
statutes, the Court's test is dramatically inade-
quate.11 1 The' reasoning utilized by Justice
Rehnquist in fashioning the Court's fair warn-
ing test, viewed in this light, is difficult to
resolve in the context of the Furman decision.
In Davis v. Georgia ,"'6 the Court held in a per
curiam decision that a death sentence cannot
stand if it is found that even one venireman
was excluded because he or she had some
qualms about capital punishment. The Court
recognized the propriety of excluding those
that are irrevocably opposed to capital punish-
ment, but felt that the existence of doubts
alone is not sufficient to exclude one from a
jury. Specifically, it found Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois1 7 controlling, which involved a situation in
which over thirty veniremen were excluded
solely on the basis of their expressed qualms
about the use of capital punishment. The
Court, in addition, cited three other cases"
8
11 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
"' 97 S. Ct. at 2300.
"4 See note 7 supra.
115 97 S. Ct. at 2306.
116 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
:1 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
18 Wigglesworth v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (ex-
clusion of one such venireman); Harris v. Texas, 403
U.S. 947 (1971) (exclusion of five or six such venire-
men); Adams v. Washington, 403 U.S. 947 (1971)
(exclusion of from three to ten such veniremen).
The Court reversed all those judgments without
opinion, insofar as they imposed the death sentence
and cited Witherspoon as authority.
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for the proposition that the exclusion of even
one veniremen would lead to a reversal of a
death sentence. Justice Rehnquist dissented,
claiming Witherspoon should not control and
agreed with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Georgia:
The rationale of Witherspoon and its progeny is
not violated where merely one of a qualified class
or group is excluded .... 119 "This record is
completely void of any evidence of a systematic
and intentional exclusion of a qualified group of
jurors so as to deny the appellant a jury of
veniremen representing a cross section of the
community.
1 20
In so arguing, he overlooked the other three
decisions cited by the Court. Justice Rehnquist
desired to grant certiorari and set a hearing to
determine whether this particular venireperson
was unalterably opposed to capital punishment
since she had been dismissed before that deter-
mination had been made. The decision was
11 Davis v. Georgia, 236 Ga. 804, 809-10, 225
S.E.2d 241, 244-45 (1976) (emphasis in original).
120 429 U.S. at 122-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting Davis v. Georgia, 236 Ga. 804, 809-10, 225
S.E.2d 241, 244-45 (1976).
short, the opinion to the point, and it was
certainly well substantiated. This case repre-
sents still another instance this Term where
the Court has employed a cautious approach,
choosing to hold the line on the use of the
death penalty.
The Supreme Court handled five cases this
Term on the death penalty, an indication that
there were and still are many issues left for the
Court to resolve. For example, the Court has
made clear the desire to leave open the question
of mandatory capital punishment for someone
serving a life sentence who commits murderY.
2 1
Also, in light of the Court's decision on rape in
Coker v. Georgia, the constitutionality of numer-
ous statutes prescribing death for crimes not
involving the death of its victims, such as hijack-
ing, mass terrorism, kidnapping and treason,
is left in doubt. The indications, however, are
that such statutes will not stand. The Court has
become cautious, almost conservative, in its
willingness to approve of the use of the death
penalty, thus ensuring that the various states
will resort to the death penalty only in a very
particular fashion and only for a limited num-
ber of offenses.
121 See note 63 supra.
[Vol. 68
